

GEORGE MASON UNIVERSITY

Econ 886: Experimental Economics II

spring 2017

Professor César Martinelli
ICES-GMU
cmarti33@gmu.edu

A. Objective and description

This course develops the main ideas of game theory, its main applications in economics and political science, and its relation with experimental economics.

B. References

The main reference for the lectures is the graduate textbook *A Course in Game Theory* by Martin J. Osborne and Ariel Rubinstein, The MIT Press, 1994. (Additional papers will be assigned in each lecture.)

C. Syllabus

1. Choice under uncertainty
2. Strategic games and Nash equilibrium
3. Mixed, correlated and evolutionary equilibrium
4. Bayesian games and auctions
5. Extensive games with perfect information
6. Nash bargaining and strategic bargaining
7. Repeated games
8. Extensive games with imperfect information
9. Coalitional games and the core
10. Matching

D. Grading

Problems sets will be assigned every other week to be turned the week after. Students can skip turning one problem set without any further justification. Grading will come from the problem sets (20%), the midterm (35%) and the final exam (45%). If the grade in the final exam exceeds that in the midterm, the grade in the final exam will substitute for the midterm as well.

E. Office hours

I am available most Thursdays from 10 am to 1 pm in my office in Arlington; by appointment any day of the week.